Clientelism and Corruption in Local Elections: Evidence from Indonesia’s Pilkada

Abstract

This study explores the interplay between clientelism and corruption during Indonesia’s local elections (Pilkada), focusing on how patronage networks influence electoral outcomes and governance. By analyzing election data, campaign finance reports, and qualitative interviews with local officials and voters in selected districts, the paper investigates how clientelist practices perpetuate corruption and undermine democratic accountability. The findings reveal that clientelism remains deeply embedded in the political culture of many regions, facilitating vote-buying, nepotism, and rent-seeking behavior. These practices erode public trust and weaken institutional efforts to promote transparency and fairness in elections. Despite regulatory frameworks designed to curb corruption, enforcement is often lax or compromised by vested interests. The study contributes to global discussions on electoral corruption by highlighting the challenges of implementing democratic reforms in contexts marked by patronage politics. It emphasizes the need for stronger electoral oversight, civic education, and grassroots mobilization to disrupt clientelist networks and enhance democratic integrity in Indonesia and other emerging democracies.