

Police Reform and Democratic Governance in Indonesia: Institutional Change, Accountability, and Public Confidence

Muhammad Ilham*

Pusat Studi Kepolisian, Universitas Negeri Semarang, Semarang, Indonesia
muhammadiilham@students.unnes.ac.id

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*Corresponding Author

Abstract

Police reform represents a continuing challenge for democratic states seeking to transform law enforcement institutions inherited from authoritarian or highly centralised governance systems. Indonesia's police reform has involved changes in institutional structure, professional standards, accountability mechanisms, and relationships with society. This study examines the relationship between police reform and democratic governance in Indonesia. Using qualitative institutional analysis, the research explores major dimensions of reform, including organisational autonomy, accountability, professionalism, public participation, and civilian oversight. The study argues that institutional restructuring alone does not guarantee democratic policing. Sustainable reform depends on changes in organisational culture, leadership, accountability practices, and police–society relations. Public confidence emerges not only from police effectiveness but also from perceptions of fairness, transparency, and institutional responsiveness. The Indonesian experience demonstrates both the opportunities and limitations of police reform within a democratic transition. The article contributes to comparative police reform scholarship by analysing Indonesia as a case of institutional transformation and by linking police reform to broader theories of democratic governance. It concludes that future reform should prioritise institutional accountability, professional capacity, public engagement, and credible external oversight.

[Reformasi kepolisian merupakan tantangan berkelanjutan bagi negara-negara demokratis yang berupaya mentransformasi institusi penegak hukum warisan sistem pemerintahan otoriter atau yang sangat terpusat. Reformasi kepolisian di Indonesia mencakup perubahan dalam struktur kelembagaan, standar profesional, mekanisme akuntabilitas, serta hubungan dengan masyarakat. Studi ini mengkaji hubungan antara reformasi kepolisian dan tata kelola demokratis di Indonesia. Dengan menggunakan analisis kelembagaan kualitatif, penelitian ini mengeksplorasi dimensi-dimensi utama reformasi,

termasuk otonomi organisasi, akuntabilitas, profesionalisme, partisipasi publik, dan pengawasan sipil. Studi ini berargumen bahwa restrukturisasi kelembagaan semata tidak menjamin praktik kepolisian yang demokratis. Reformasi yang berkelanjutan bergantung pada perubahan dalam budaya organisasi, kepemimpinan, praktik akuntabilitas, dan hubungan antara polisi dan masyarakat. Kepercayaan publik muncul tidak hanya dari efektivitas kinerja polisi, tetapi juga dari persepsi mengenai keadilan, transparansi, dan responsivitas kelembagaan. Pengalaman Indonesia menunjukkan adanya peluang sekaligus keterbatasan dalam reformasi kepolisian di tengah transisi demokrasi. Artikel ini memberikan kontribusi pada kajian komparatif mengenai reformasi kepolisian dengan menganalisis Indonesia sebagai kasus transformasi kelembagaan serta mengaitkan reformasi kepolisian dengan teori-teori tata kelola demokratis yang lebih luas. Studi ini menyimpulkan bahwa reformasi di masa depan harus memprioritaskan akuntabilitas kelembagaan, kapasitas profesional, pelibatan publik, dan pengawasan eksternal yang kredibel.]

Keywords: police reform, democratic governance, police accountability, institutional change, Indonesia

Introduction

The structural transformation of coercive state apparatuses constitutes a foundational requirement for polities undergoing democratization following prolonged periods of authoritarian rule. When democratic transitions unfold, newly established civilian regimes face the delicate institutional imperative of reconfiguring law enforcement agencies from instruments of regime maintenance into public institutions grounded in constitutionalism and the rule of law. In post-authoritarian contexts, police organizations often inherit deeply ingrained habits of operational opacity, militarized command structures, and insulated autonomy that actively resist democratic oversight. The trajectory of institutional transformation in these settings demonstrates that formal legislative restructuring rarely leads automatically to immediate normative compliance or behavioral change among frontline actors. Instead, security sector reform unfolds as a contested historical process wherein institutional legacies continuously interact with emerging democratic norms, executive politics, and societal demands for procedural justice. Understanding how police institutions undergo structural change while navigating deeply rooted organizational habits remains a central inquiry in comparative political science, public administration, and socio-legal studies.

Within the broader landscape of post-authoritarian security sector transformations, the case of the Indonesian National Police (Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia, or Polri) offers critical empirical insights for comparative institutional analysis. Following the collapse of President Soeharto's authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia embarked on an ambitious program of

democratic governance reform known as *Reformasi*. A primary milestone of this democratic transition was the formal separation of the police from the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI), codified through People's Consultative Assembly Decrees TAP MPR No. VI/2000 and TAP MPR No. VII/2000, and subsequently consolidated under Law No. 2 of 2002 regarding the Indonesian National Police. This legislative pivot formally ended decades of militarized policing under the ABRI umbrella, establishing Polri as an independent civilian law enforcement institution directly answerable to the President. This institutional emancipation was normative in intent, designed to build a professional, accountable, and citizen-oriented security apparatus capable of upholding democratic governance.

Despite more than two decades of formal structural autonomy, the operational reality of Indonesian policing reveals persistent governance friction between legal mandates and actual institutional practices. While Polri successfully expanded its budgetary resources, operational capacity, and administrative autonomy, the depth of its democratic transformation remains a subject of intense debate among political scientists, legal scholars, and human rights practitioners. The institutional trajectory of post-1998 police reform illustrates that while formal organizational structures can be rewritten through legislative decrees, informal organizational culture, internal patronage networks, and traditional command habits exhibit strong path dependence. High-profile scandals involving institutional corruption, extrajudicial enforcement practices, procedural misconduct, and the perceived instrumentalization of law enforcement in political contestations have periodically eroded public confidence. These recurring crises underscore an ongoing structural tension within Indonesia's democratic architecture: a powerful, highly centralized law enforcement agency operating within a democratic political system characterized by fragmented civilian oversight and variable institutional checks.

This article examines the relationship between police reform, institutional accountability, and democratic governance in Indonesia. By applying a qualitative historical-institutional framework, the study evaluates how structural separation from the military translated into operational practices, how accountability mechanisms function across internal and external dimensions, and how public confidence is constructed amid evolving state-society dynamics. The central thesis of this study argues that structural organizational separation is a necessary but insufficient condition for democratic policing. Sustainable police reform requires deeper transformation across organizational culture, internal incentive structures, civilian oversight mechanisms, and everyday procedural fairness. When institutional reform remains limited to structural autonomy without corresponding mechanisms of binding public accountability, law enforcement agencies risk evolving into self-referential bureaucratic enclaves that compromise democratic governance.

This study makes several contributions to the comparative literature on security sector reform and democratic governance in transitional societies. First, it

offers a theoretical account of institutional change within post-authoritarian police organizations, illuminating how legacy structures persist beneath modern legal frameworks. Second, it systematically evaluates the performance and structural limitations of external oversight institutions in Southeast Asia, using Indonesia's Kompolnas and Ombudsman as case studies. Third, it examines the modern phenomenon of digital accountability and public monitoring, demonstrating how citizen engagement interacts with police responsiveness in contemporary developing democracies. By linking theoretical concepts of democratic policing with empirical evidence from Indonesia's democratic transition, this paper provides insights into the structural opportunities and institutional constraints that define police transformation across the Global South.

Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

A. Democratic Policing and Institutional Governance

The concept of democratic policing provides the primary normative and analytical framework for evaluating law enforcement transformation in democratic states. Unlike regime policing, which prioritizes the protection of the state apparatus, ruling political elites, and executive stability, democratic policing is defined by its allegiance to the rule of law, constitutional rights, and public service (Bayley 2006, 12–15). Democratic policing operates on the premise that the police derive their authority not from state coercion, but from the consent of the governed, achieved through procedural fairness, transparency, and public accountability (Manning 2010, 45–48). In a consolidated democracy, police power is circumscribed by clear statutory boundaries, subject to independent external monitoring, and oriented toward serving the security needs of all citizens equitably. Theoretical scholarship emphasizes that democratic policing must satisfy three core conditions: strict adherence to constitutional law, robust external accountability to civilian authorities, and operational commitment to procedural justice during routine citizen interactions (Tyler 2006, 375–380).

The theoretical literature on institutional governance highlights that transforming non-democratic police forces requires reconfiguring both hard structural parameters and soft organizational norms. Institutional redesign involves establishing formal legal boundaries, adjusting command hierarchies, creating specialized oversight bodies, and professionalizing recruitment and training protocols (Pino and Johnson 2012, 88–92). However, structural theories of institutional change caution that changing formal rules alone does not guarantee changes in behavioral outcomes. When new democratic legal frameworks are superimposed upon deeply entrenched bureaucratic organizations, legacy informal practices often adapt to the new institutional environment rather than disappearing entirely. Consequently, democratic policing requires aligning formal institutional mandates with internal organizational incentives, ensuring that career advancement, operational evaluations, and professional status within the agency

reward adherence to democratic standards and human rights (Sklansky 2008, 102–108).

DEMOCRATIC POLICING FRAMEWORK

1. Rule of Law & Constitutional Limits
 - Statutory boundaries on executive coercion
 - Protection of civil liberties and human rights
 2. Multi-Layered Accountability Architecture
 - Internal Disciplinary Systems (e.g., Divpropam)
 - External Civilian Oversight (e.g., Kompolnas, ORI, Komnas HAM)
 3. Procedural Justice & Public Legitimacy
 - Transparent and unbiased law enforcement
 - Citizen-oriented responsiveness and public trust
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B. Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependence in Security Reform

Historical institutionalism offers valuable analytical tools for explaining why police reform in post-authoritarian contexts often produces mixed or partial outcomes. Central to historical institutionalism is the concept of path dependence, which posits that institutional decisions made during critical junctures establish enduring trajectories that shape future policy choices and organizational behavior (Mahoney 2000, 507–512). Critical junctures—such as regime collapses, democratic revolutions, or major constitutional overhauls—create rare windows of opportunity for foundational institutional redesign. However, once an institutional path is established, self-reinforcing mechanisms, including feedback loops, vested interests, and organizational routines, generate institutional inertia that makes subsequent fundamental changes difficult (Pierson 2004, 22–28). In law enforcement institutions, path dependence manifests through informal norms, occupational solidarity, and institutionalized operational methods inherited from previous political regimes.

In transitional democracies, police reform frequently exhibits institutional layering or conversion rather than complete organizational replacement (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 18–24). Institutional layering occurs when new democratic rules and oversight bodies are added alongside existing organizational structures without fully dismantling legacy frameworks. Institutional conversion happens when existing institutions are redirected toward new goals while retaining their core operational mechanisms. When applied to security sector reform, these concepts explain how police organizations can adopt democratic language, establish human


rights departments, and participate in international professionalization programs while preserving centralized command habits and informal protective networks (Goldsmith 2005, 121–125). Path-dependent institutional analysis demonstrates that overcoming legacy habits requires sustained political commitment, effective civilian oversight, and structural incentives that continuously disrupt non-democratic informal norms.

C. Accountability Dynamics: Internal Systems and Civilian Oversight

Accountability in law enforcement operates across two main dimensions: internal professional control and external civilian oversight. Internal accountability relies on institutionalized disciplinary hierarchies, professional standards units, and internal affairs divisions designed to monitor compliance with organizational codes of conduct (Prenzler 2009, 63–67). While internal systems are essential for maintaining command discipline and operational consistency, socio-legal research highlights their inherent limitations when addressing systemic misconduct. Internal oversight bodies often suffer from institutional conflicts of interest, occupational solidarity, and a tendency to frame structural failures as isolated incidents caused by individual bad actors (Walker 2005, 88–94). Without external verification, internal disciplinary systems risk becoming mechanisms for institutional self-protection rather than instruments of public accountability.

External civilian oversight serves as a vital democratic counterweight to police autonomy by introducing independent review mechanisms into law enforcement governance. Civilian oversight models vary from advisory commissions and ombudsman offices to independent investigative agencies equipped with subpoena power and prosecutorial authority (Stone and Ward 2000, 15–20). The efficacy of external civilian oversight depends heavily on three structural factors: statutory independence, adequate institutional resourcing, and the legal authority to enforce binding corrective measures (De Guzman 2008, 142–148). In many developing democracies, external oversight institutions are established as advisory bodies lacking binding authority, leaving them reliant on executive goodwill or public advocacy to effect change. Comparative research shows that when external oversight lacks binding enforcement power, public trust in legal redress declines, reinforcing informal strategies to demand police accountability.

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY ARCHITECTURE



D. Procedural Justice, Institutional Trust, and Public Confidence

Procedural justice theory asserts that public compliance with the law and trust in legal authorities are determined more by the fairness of the processes used by police than by the fairness or favorability of the outcomes produced (Sunshine and Tyler 2003, 514–519). Citizens evaluate police legitimacy through four key procedural dimensions: voice (being given an opportunity to explain their situation), neutrality (unbiased and rule-based decision-making), respect (being treated with dignity and courteousness), and trustworthy motives (perceiving that the police genuinely care about public welfare). When police encounters consistently embody procedural justice, public trust increases, promoting voluntary compliance, crime reporting, and civic cooperation with law enforcement agencies (Jackson et al. 2012, 1052–1058).

In post-authoritarian democracies, building public confidence presents unique challenges due to historical legacies of state-sponsored coercion and public mistrust. When citizens historically experienced the police as an instrument of state control, institutional trust remains fragile and easily undermined by operational abuses (Tankebe 2013, 108–113). Furthermore, empirical studies in developing contexts reveal that public perceptions of police legitimacy are shaped not only by procedural justice but also by institutional effectiveness in controlling crime and maintaining public order (Bradford et al. 2014, 23–28). Achieving sustainable public confidence requires law enforcement agencies to demonstrate operational

competence while upholding strict standards of procedural fairness, legal transparency, and equal treatment under the law.

Methods

This study uses a qualitative institutional analysis design to evaluate police reform, accountability, and democratic governance in Indonesia. Qualitative institutional methodology is well-suited for examining complex political processes, legal reform trajectories, and organizational dynamics within transitional state apparatuses (Yin 2018, 45–50). By integrating historical reconstruction with structural analysis, the research traces how legislative frameworks, executive policies, and informal institutional norms have interacted to shape post-1998 policing in Indonesia. The qualitative design allows for a nuanced evaluation of formal legal rules alongside the informal practices that define daily law enforcement operations.

The empirical data for this study were gathered through a document analysis of primary legal sources, official government records, institutional oversight reports, and academic research. Primary statutory sources analyzed include TAP MPR No. VI/2000, TAP MPR No. VII/2000, Law No. 2 of 2002 regarding the Indonesian National Police, Presidential Regulation No. 17 of 2011 concerning Korpri, and relevant institutional regulations issued by the Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Perkap). The analysis also examined public performance evaluations, policy briefs, and investigation summaries published by key statutory bodies, including the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (ORI), the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), and the National Police Commission (Korpri).

To ensure analytical rigor and contextual validity, the legal and institutional document analysis was triangulated with empirical secondary data from peer-reviewed academic journals published between 2000 and 2025. The secondary literature was selected through systematic database searches across Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar using targeted keywords including "police reform Indonesia," "Korpri accountability," "democratic policing Southeast Asia," "procedural justice Indonesia," and "civilian police oversight." Studies were screened based on methodological rigor, thematic relevance to institutional change and governance, and publication in peer-reviewed journals within the specified timeframe.

Data processing and interpretation followed thematic content analysis procedures, categorizing findings into four primary analytical domains: structural autonomy, internal and external accountability mechanisms, organizational culture and professionalization, and public confidence dynamics. Thematic coding was guided by the theoretical frameworks of historical institutionalism and democratic policing, allowing the research to evaluate discrepancies between formal statutory mandates and actual operational outcomes. The synthesis of legal statutes, institutional performance metrics, and peer-reviewed scholarly literature provides

a comprehensive, empirically grounded assessment of Indonesia's police reform trajectory within its broader democratic transition.

Analysis and Discussion

A. Structural Independence, Executive Power, and the Autonomy Paradox

The formal separation of the Indonesian National Police from the armed forces in 2000 and the subsequent passage of Law No. 2 of 2002 established a new institutional baseline for law enforcement in Indonesia (Meliala 2001, 115–119). By removing Polri from the military command structure and placing it directly under the authority of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the reform framework sought to create an independent civilian force focused on public security, law enforcement, and community protection. This structural separation succeeded in demilitarizing the formal organizational status of the police and ending its official role in national defense doctrine (Honna 2003, 145–150). Furthermore, the structural autonomy granted to Polri enabled significant organizational expansion, budgetary increases, and infrastructure development, transforming the police into one of the most resource-intensive state institutions in post-authoritarian Indonesia (Mietzner 2014, 68–72).

EVOLUTION OF INDONESIAN POLICE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE

NEW ORDER ERA (1966–1998)

- Integrated under Armed Forces (ABRI) umbrella
 - Militarized doctrine, training, and operational structure
 - Subordinated to national security and regime protection mandates
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v (TAP MPR VI/2000 & VII/2000)

POST-REFORMASI ERA (2002–PRESENT)

- Formally separated as an independent civilian law enforcement agency
 - Directly answerable to the President under Law No. 2 of 2002
 - Expansion of internal administrative, budgetary, and operational authority
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However, placing Polri directly under executive authority created an institutional configuration that scholars refer to as the autonomy paradox (Aspinall and Berenschot 2019, 210–215). While direct executive reporting protected the police from political control by local governments or regional parliaments, it concentrated significant operational authority in the national police leadership under the direct purview of the President. In the absence of strong, independent parliamentary oversight mechanisms, this direct executive relationship created

opportunities for political influence during national electoral cycles and high-stakes political contests (Mietzner 2018, 245–250). Rather than functioning as an insulated, politically neutral public agency, the police force's structural position made it an attractive resource for executive power management, generating debate over the political neutrality of state security apparatuses in Indonesia's democratic system.

The structural expansion of Polri's statutory authority across law enforcement, intelligence gathering, public order maintenance, and regulatory licensing gradually established the institution as a powerful bureaucratic entity (Suryana 2022, 88–92). Historical institutional analysis shows that while structural autonomy successfully prevented the remilitarization of policing, it created a centralized command structure with limited external checks. The concentration of investigatory power, regulatory functions, and domestic intelligence capacity within a single centralized organization limited horizontal accountability from other civilian governance institutions (Crouch 2010, 134–140). Consequently, post-1998 police reform highlights the institutional reality that structural independence, if unaccompanied by robust horizontal checks and balances, can consolidate organizational power without guaranteeing democratic accountability.

INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION AND GOVERNANCE MATRIX		
Dimension	Pre-Reformasi (New Order)	Post-Reformasi (2002-Present)
Organizational Status	Integrated in Armed Forces	Independent Civilian Agency
Command Hierarchy	Military High Command	Executive (Presidential Line)
Primary Mandate	Regime Security & Defense	Public Order & Law Enforcement
Primary Oversight	Internal Military Discipline	Dual Internal & External Bodies
Public Orientation	Coercive State Control	Service & Community Orientation

B. The Architecture of Accountability: Internal Systems and Civilian Oversight Bottlenecks

Accountability within the Indonesian National Police is structurally divided between internal disciplinary mechanisms and external civilian oversight bodies. Internally, the primary agency responsible for enforcing professional ethics, investigating officer misconduct, and managing administrative discipline is the Division of Profession and Internal Security (Divisi Profesi dan Pengamanan, or Divpropam) (Muradi 2014, 102–106). Divpropam operates through codes of conduct codified under police regulations, processing complaints concerning procedural violations, corruption, and abuse of authority. While Divpropam maintains a structured administrative presence across national, provincial, and regional levels, its operational effectiveness is constrained by its position within the internal command hierarchy. Internal investigations into high-ranking officers or

systemic corruption frequently encounter institutional loyalty barriers, raising public concerns regarding investigative objectivity and selective disciplinary enforcement (Davies 2019, 315–320).

External civilian oversight is primarily represented by the National Police Commission (Komisi Kepolisian Nasional, or Kompolnas), established pursuant to Law No. 2 of 2002 and regulated by Presidential Regulation No. 17 of 2011. Kompolnas is tasked with assisting the President in determining police policy directions and conducting performance evaluations of the institution (Jasin 2017, 78–82). However, Kompolnas lacks independent investigative authority, subpoena powers, and the legal ability to impose binding sanctions on officers found guilty of misconduct. Its statutory mandate limits its role to offering recommendations to the President and forwarding public complaints to Polri leadership for internal investigation. This advisory structure restricts Kompolnas from functioning as an authoritative external check, rendering its effectiveness dependent on executive support and police cooperation (Sherlock 2021, 160–165).

In addition to Kompolnas, other statutory oversight bodies, including the Ombudsman of the Republic of Indonesia (ORI) and the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM), handle public grievances concerning police misconduct. ORI frequently reports that police agencies account for a significant proportion of public administration complaints, primarily regarding delays in investigation, procedural errors, and lack of operational transparency (Ombudsman Republik Indonesia 2023, 45–50). Similarly, Komnas HAM consistently identifies Polri as one of the most frequently reported state institutions regarding alleged human rights violations, particularly concerning excessive force during public assemblies and investigative detentions (Komnas HAM 2024, 32–36). Despite these documented findings, external oversight bodies face systemic limitations because their statutory findings are advisory, leaving final disciplinary and prosecutorial decisions within internal police jurisdictions.

COMPARATIVE EVALUATION OF EXTERNAL OVERSIGHT BODIES			
Agency	Primary Statutory Scope	Investigative Power	Enforcement Status
Kompolnas	Policy Advisory & Monitoring	Non-Binding / Review	Advisory to President
ORI	Maladministration Review	Fact-Finding / Audit	Advisory / Public
Komnas HAM	Human Rights Compliance	Inquiry / Reporting	Advisory / Referral
DPR (Com.3)	Legislative & Budget Oversight	Parliamentary Review	Political / Legislative

C. Organizational Culture, Bureaucratic Inertia, and the Human Rights Imperative

A persistent challenge in Indonesia's police reform trajectory is the gap between formal legal rules and informal organizational culture. During the New Order era, policing was characterized by military doctrines that prioritized coercive

state control, hierarchy, and operational secrecy over civil liberties (Santoso 2008, 95–99). Following the 1998 democratic transition, Polri leadership introduced educational reforms, integrated human rights modules into police academy curricula, and promulgated Chief of Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 8 of 2009 regarding the Implementation of Human Rights Standards in Police Duties. These normative policy measures were intended to shift the institutional mindset from coercive control toward citizen-oriented protection and human rights compliance (Qodari 2015, 140–145).

TRANSFORMATION OF POLICE INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE

LEGACY INFORMAL NORMS

- Command loyalty and operational secrecy
 - Coercive order maintenance over procedural justice
 - Informal patronage and internal solidarity networks
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v (Institutional Barriers & Friction)

NORMATIVE DEMOCRATIC GOALS

- Human Rights Compliance (Perkap No. 8/2009)
 - Community-oriented, transparent service delivery
 - Meritocratic advancement and procedural fairness
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Despite normative administrative reforms, socio-legal research demonstrates that informal organizational cultures often resist structural policy directives. Frontline officers frequently continue to rely on coercive investigative techniques, informal fee extractions, and protective solidarity networks (Kristiansen and Ramli 2006, 210–215). Sociological studies of police academies in Indonesia show that informal socialization during basic training reinforces hierarchical deference and group cohesion, often overshadowing formal human rights instruction (Jacobs and van Dijk 2020, 175–180). This organizational friction illustrates the core historical-institutionalist insight that changing formal administrative regulations does not automatically reform deeply embedded informal subcultures.

The persistence of informal organizational norms is further sustained by internal administrative structures governing recruitment, promotion, and career advancement. While formal policies emphasize meritocracy and professional capability, informal patronage networks and transactional practices have historically influenced career progression within the police hierarchy (Butt 2012, 280–285). When career advancement is perceived to rely on informal alliances or financial capital rather than professional performance and human rights compliance, incentives for personal integrity and procedural fairness are diminished. Consequently, institutionalizing democratic policing requires aligning

internal promotion systems, performance evaluations, and disciplinary enforcement with the normative principles of human rights and public accountability.


ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND BEHAVIORAL DYNAMICS MATRIX		
Domain	Formal Policy Objective	Informal Operational Reality
Training Standards	Human Rights & Public Service	Command Loyalty & Coercion
Career Advancement	Meritocratic Performance	Patronage & Transactional
Public Interactions	Procedural Justice & Courtesy	Discretionary Overreach
Internal Discipline	Strict Ethical Compliance	Protective Solidarity

D. Public Confidence, Procedural Fairness, and Digital Accountability Dynamics

Public confidence in law enforcement is a crucial indicator of successful police reform and democratic governance. In Indonesia, public perceptions of Polri have fluctuated over time, reflecting a tension between recognized improvements in operational capabilities and recurring public dissatisfaction with officer misconduct (LSI 2022, 12–16). Empirical studies indicate that public trust in the Indonesian police is heavily influenced by personal encounters with frontline officers, perceptions of corruption in routine administrative services, and equal treatment under the law (Adhikara and Putranto 2025, 55–60). When citizens experience procedural unfairness, extortion, or biased enforcement during everyday encounters, institutional legitimacy declines regardless of broad strategic achievements or national counter-terrorism successes.

In recent years, public accountability dynamics in Indonesia have been reshaped by the rapid expansion of digital communication platforms and social media networks. Citizens increasingly utilize digital platforms to document, publish, and disseminate instances of police misconduct, procedural delays, and selective law enforcement (Rahmat and Setiawan 2024, 102–106). This phenomenon, often referred to in public discourse as "viral justice," has created an informal external accountability channel that bypasses traditional, bureaucratic complaint reporting procedures. High-profile cases that gain significant online visibility frequently prompt swift responses from senior police leadership, leading to internal investigations, public reassignments, or formal disciplinary proceedings (Sandiy, Ghafur, Solikhah Yuliatiningtyas 2025, 1730–1735).

INFORMAL DIGITAL ACCOUNTABILITY CYCLE ("VIRAL JUSTICE")



While digital transparency provides civil society with tools to highlight institutional abuses, relying on viral public pressure reveals structural limitations within formal oversight mechanisms. Reactive accountability driven by social media engagement can lead to selective enforcement, where publicized grievances receive prompt administrative attention while systemic issues without viral visibility remain unaddressed (Subartono et al. 2026, 401–405). Moreover, public reliance on digital exposure highlights a broader lack of public faith in standard internal grievance channels. Sustainable democratic governance requires transitioning from reactive, media-driven responses to institutionalized, transparent, and accessible accountability procedures that consistently protect civil rights regardless of public media visibility.

Conclusion

Indonesia's experience with police reform over the past quarter-century offers valuable lessons regarding the opportunities and limitations of security sector transformation in transitional democracies. The formal structural separation of Polri from the military established an essential foundation for civilian law enforcement, providing the agency with the operational independence, resources, and authority necessary to function in a modern state. However, this study demonstrates that structural autonomy alone does not guarantee democratic policing. In the absence of binding external civilian oversight, effective horizontal checks, and systemic internal cultural reform, structural independence can lead to institutional power concentration that risks undermining democratic governance principles.

The persistent gap between formal legal frameworks and operational realities highlights the path-dependent nature of law enforcement institutions. Legacy organizational habits, informal patronage networks, and command-oriented subcultures continue to create friction against normative democratic mandates. While progress has been achieved in formal education, strategic planning, and digital public engagement, public confidence remains vulnerable to procedural

misconduct, corruption, and perceived institutional bias. Achieving sustainable democratic policing requires moving beyond structural changes to address internal incentive systems, career advancement structures, and everyday procedural interactions between police officers and the public.

To advance democratic governance and strengthen public confidence in Indonesia's security architecture, future reform initiatives should focus on four key policy priorities: First, the statutory authority of external civilian oversight bodies must be strengthened through legislative reform. Kopolnas should be granted statutory independence, dedicated budgetary resources, and expanded powers to conduct independent inquiries, subpoena records, and issue binding recommendations for internal disciplinary proceedings. Granting external oversight bodies actual legal authority is essential to break internal institutional protectionism and rebuild public trust in formal complaint mechanisms.

Second, internal administrative incentives must be systematically aligned with democratic standards and procedural justice principles. Polri leadership should reform internal recruitment, promotion, and assignment systems to emphasize meritocracy, professional integrity, and demonstrated compliance with human rights standards. Internal evaluation metrics should transition from simple quantitative enforcement targets to holistic assessments that evaluate community engagement, procedural fairness, and ethical conduct.

Third, institutional mechanisms for public complaint processing must be modernized, digitized, and made fully transparent. Rather than relying on informal social media visibility to trigger disciplinary action, Polri should establish an integrated, publicly auditable digital complaint system accessible to all citizens. This platform should allow complainants to track investigative progress independently and mandate formal responses from internal affairs divisions within clear, statutory timeframes.

Fourth, professional education programs must extend beyond theoretical human rights instruction to emphasize practical procedural justice training throughout an officer's career. Academy curricula and continuing professional development should incorporate scenario-based training focused on conflict de-escalation, unbiased decision-making, respectful citizen communication, and community-oriented problem-solving. By embedding procedural justice into daily operational habits, the police institution can build sustainable public legitimacy grounded in mutual trust, constitutional accountability, and democratic governance.

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